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 Introduction 
New Zealand’s accident compensation system is ‘no-fault’, meaning that New Zealanders 
are compensated for their injuries whether or not they can find someone to blame for their 
misfortune. However, until 2005, claimants injured while receiving medical treatment 
had to show either that their injuries were caused by negligence, or that their injuries 
were both rare and severe. The negligence standard was taken from tort law, and required 
the claimant to show that the injury was a registered health professional’s fault. 
This fault requirement created many of the problems that tort law had in the past: it was 
inefficient, arbitrary, and created a blaming culture that bred hostility between the 
Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), the injured, and health professionals. In 
2004, ACC published a review of the medical misadventure provisions, calling for them 
to be replaced by no-fault compensation provisions in line with the spirit and content of 
the rest of the accident compensation scheme. In 2005, medical misadventure became 
treatment injury, and both application and acceptance rates rose for claims concerning 
injuries received during medical treatment. However, the treatment injury provisions still 
contained fault elements, despite the legislature’s claim that the provisions were no-fault.  
In this paper, I will address the role of fault in a compensation scheme for those injured 
during medical treatment. First, I will define fault in its tort law context and outline some 
strengths and weaknesses of fault as a legal concept. Then, I will provide a short 
overview of New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme, the medical misadventure 
provisions, the push for reform, and the structure of the treatment injury provisions. This 
will give background to an in-depth discussion of the treatment injury provisions’ 
incorporation of fault standards. Also relevant to this discussion is the accident 
compensation scheme’s reporting mechanism, which potentially complicates ACC’s role 
as purely an injury compensating, preventing and rehabilitating body. Finally, it is 
necessary to consider whether compensation itself is inherently fault-based, an argument 
raised by some commentators. 
My conclusion is that some aspects of the treatment injury provisions still use fault to 
determine cover in some situations. The provisions give particular weight to the fault of 
the claimant in causing her own injury. This use of fault standards can be removed from 
the treatment injury provisions with some minor amendments, which are set out at the 
end of this paper. 
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 Defining Fault 
A Introduction 
To understand the accident compensation scheme as a no-fault system and analyse the 
place of fault in treatment injury cover, it is first necessary to define ‘fault’ as a legal 
concept. ‘Fault’ is defined in the Butterworths New Zealand Law Dictionary as:1 
1. A defect, blemish, flaw or imperfection. 
2. A mistake or error in thought or action. In contract, a fault is an error which may 
include some instances of carelessness.  
3. Negligence, breach of statutory duty or any other act or omission which gives 
rise to a liability in tort. 
For the purpose of the Contributory Negligence Act 1947, ‘fault’ is defined as 
“negligence, breach of statutory duty, or other act or omission which gives rise to a 
liability in tort or would, apart from this Act, give rise to the defence of contributory 
negligence.”2  
The accident compensation scheme’s no-fault principle was created in opposition to 
previous compensation systems that depended on fault – tort and criminal law – so the 
concepts of fault found in those two areas of law are relevant to determining what fault is 
for the purposes of the accident compensation scheme. 
It is worth noting that the accident compensation scheme also replaced suing for personal 
injury in contract,3 but contract law works on strict liability principles, and fault is mostly 
irrelevant to its application.4 The scheme also prevents people from suing in 
administrative law for breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 when the 
damage caused is personal injury.5 However, as administrative law damages were created 
by the courts well after the scheme was introduced, the use of fault in administrative law 
is not relevant to the use of fault in accident compensation. Therefore, what follows is 
only a consideration of fault in criminal law and in tort law. 
  
1  Peter Spiller Butterworths New Zealand Law Dictionary (7th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2011) at 
115. 
2  Section 2. 
3  Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 317(2)–(3). 
4  John Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd Law of Contract in New Zealand (4th ed, 
LexisNexis, Wellington, 2012) at 696–697. Although for a different opinion see Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg “The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected Circumstances, 
Interpretation, Mistake and Non-Performance” (2009) 107 Mich L Rev 1413. 
5  Simpson v Attorney-General [1994] NZLR 667 (CA) [Baigent’s Case]. 
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B In criminal law 
Most criminal offences require mens rea, a state of mind that makes the defendant at fault 
for what has happened. Mens rea is usually satisfied by showing either that the defendant 
intended the elements of the crime, or was reckless to whether the elements occurred, 
meaning that the defendant foresees a likelihood that she will cause the elements of the 
crime.6  
Negligence constitutes the mens rea of some crimes, whereby a defendant can be held 
accountable for failing to take all reasonable steps or failing to act in the way a 
reasonable person would.7 Ordinary negligence is the mens rea of manslaughter in New 
Zealand,8 while most other jurisdictions require a higher standard, for example gross 
negligence.9 In New Zealand, most ‘true crimes’ require intention or recklessness, which 
justifies their harsher punishments and reflects society’s moral outrage over deliberate 
wrong-doing. 
The criminal concept of fault is mostly irrelevant to a discussion of fault in accident 
compensation because no one would recommend importing criminal standards into the 
accident compensation scheme. The criminal law is relevant to accident compensation 
cover in two ways.  
First, the scheme provides cover for mental injuries sustained by victims during the 
commission of an act that matches the description of a listed offence, but the Accident 
Compensation Act 2001 (ACA) does not require that the victim prove the injurer had the 
requisite criminal intent.10 So a person injured in an assault can still get cover for that 
injury even if the assaulter had a mental illness and was incapable of forming the 
requisite intention for the criminal offence. 
Secondly, ss 25(1)(b) and (ba) require that the claimant show criminal fault where the 
cause of her injury was the inhalation or ingestion of any virus, bacterium, protozoan, or 
fungus. Unlike under s 21, a claimant under s 25(1)(b) or (ba) is required to prove that the 
inhalation or ingestion was the result of a criminal act, and may therefore need to prove 
intention.11 This approach uses a criminal fault standard, but in doing so, it allows more 
victims of crime to receive cover for their injuries. 
  
6  Laws of New Zealand Criminal (online ed) at [5.18]. 
7  See for example the Fisheries Act 1983, s 105(2)(b)(i). 
8  R v Yogasakaran [1990] 1 NZLR 399 (CA). 
9  See for example the Crimes Act 1961, s 150A. 
10  Accident Compensation Act, s 21. 
11  This would only require that the claimant point to the injurer’s criminal conviction for the act, 
which may include a breach of the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, arguably a 
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C In tort law 
Tort law usually requires fault before assigning liability. Fault usually takes the form of 
intentional or negligent action, rather than malicious action;12 so a person is liable in the 
tort of battery not only if she intended to strike another, but also if she intended a gesture 
which, by chance, struck another person as he walked by. However, it is important to 
remember that tort law is not one coherent body of law, and that liability in tort may in 
some cases be imposed for unintentional or seemingly blameless conduct, while 
malicious harm does not always constitute a tort.13  
The main objective of tort law is to shift a loss to the person who should bear it, usually 
because that person is at fault for that loss.14 The predominance of fault in tort law is 
relatively recent, beginning in the 19th century: 15 
Fault liability was seen as a moral principle: the courts regarded it as unfair to hold a 
person responsible for harm that could not have been prevented by taking reasonable 
care. Nowadays, fault remains predominant. 
The defendant’s liability in tort law may be disproportionate to the level of fault. For 
example, is the plaintiff’s loss is very high, but the defendant’s culpability only just meets 
the standard of fault required, the defendant is still liable for the total loss.  
The accident compensation scheme replaced tort liability by barring civil claims for loss 
compensated for under the ACA.16 The main tort affected was negligence (although 
battery, a less-used tort, now has almost no application in New Zealand because of the 
ACA bar). In negligence, fault is determined by reference to the ‘reasonable person’ 
standard, an abstraction that requires the plaintiff to prove to the balance of probabilities 
standard that the defendant did not act as a reasonable person would in the 
circumstances.17  The reasonable person is not the perfect person.18 If a perfect standard 
of conduct was required, fault would no longer be relevant to liability in negligence.  
                                                                                                                                            
criminal statute (see Roger Thornton (ed) Personal Injury in New Zealand (online looseleaf ed, 
Brookers) at [AC25.10]). 
12  Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (6th ed, Thompson Reuters, Wellington, 
2013) at 8–9. 
13  At 9. 
14  At 14. 
15  At 15. 
16  Section 317. 
17  The standard was first described in Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks (1856) Eng Rep 1047 (Exch), 
and fleshed out in Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205 at 224, Arland v Arland 
and Taylor [1955] OR 131 (CA) at 142, and Frost v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 
[1999] 2 AC 455 at 495 (HL). 
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The reasonable person test does not usually take into account a defendant’s particular 
weaknesses, although it does take into account the circumstances of the case.19 This 
approach allows the test to be applied equally to everyone, but it does not provide for 
purely fault-based accountability. A defendant may be found legally at fault for negligent 
conduct, but may not be morally at fault if, for example, she was not capable of providing 
the level of care expected of a reasonable person.20 The focus is on what should have 
happened, not on what the particular defendant could have done. 
The test sometimes ascribes extra skills or knowledge to a defendant, when that 
defendant has held herself out as possessing those skills or knowledge. So a doctor must 
live up to the standard of care reasonably expected of a skilled and informed doctor.  21   
A reasonable person, or a reasonable health professional, can make mistakes. Lord 
Denning MR has held that a professional person’s ‘error of judgment’ is not negligent, 
but as Stephen Todd says, relying on statements made by Lord Edmund Davies: 22 
to say that a surgeon committed an error of judgment is wholly ambiguous, for while 
some such errors may be completely consistent with the due exercise of professional 
skill, others may be so glaringly below proper standards as to make a finding of 
negligence inevitable. If the epithet “error of judgment” is to be employed in this 
context at all, it ought to be reserved for use in circumstances where the defendant’s 
conduct has measured up to proper professional standards, yet the course that he or 
she took turned out to be mistaken. The point is that a defendant can be expected to 
take care but not to guarantee that harm will be avoided. 
While a defendant must take all care reasonably expected of her, she is not required to 
avoid all harm to the plaintiff.  
D Conclusion 
The criminal fault standard is not a prerequisite to cover under the accident compensation 
scheme, and there is no danger that it will be; although of course, the scheme provides 
cover for injuries that result from criminal acts where the fault standard is reached. The 
tort fault standard is the standard most relevant to a discussion of fault in accident 
compensation cover for injuries caused by medical treatment. In particular, a discussion 
of fault in treatment injury requires consideration of the negligence standard that takes 
                                                                                                                                            
18  Todd, above n 12, at 408–409. 
19  At 409. 
20  At 15. 
21  At 410. See also Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 (HL). 
22  At 410. For Lord Edmund Davies’ original statement, see Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 
267 (HL) at 277b. 
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into account the knowledge and skill of a reasonable professional, because it is usually 
the fault of a registered health professional that is relevant in these cases. As the next two 
sections of this paper show, it was criticism of tort law, specifically negligence, that 
spurred the creation of the accident compensation scheme; and it was the negligence 
standard that was later used to determine cover for medical misadventure.  
 
 Overview of the Accident Compensation Scheme 
A The Woodhouse Report 
New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme is based on the Woodhouse Report, 
written in 1967 by a Royal Commission of Inquiry chaired by Sir Owen Woodhouse.23 
The Commission reviewed the remedies available at the time to victims of injuries, 
namely suing for common-law damages, compensation for employees injured at work 
under the Workers Compensation Act 1900, and social security.24 These remedies were 
found to be lacking. The Workers Compensation Act only provided compensation to 
employees injured at work, and therefore had limited application.25 It was also 
inefficient.26 Social security was considered inadequate because it did not compensate an 
injured person, it was means-tested, and it was provided at a flat rate, without taking into 
account a person’s prior income.27  
Suing for common-law damages was criticised by the Commission for being inefficient, 
illogical, unpredictable, arbitrary, and presenting a barrier to rehabilitation of the 
plaintiff.28 Many of the criticisms made by the Commission were criticisms of the fault 
principle – the rule that, to get damages, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was at 
fault for causing the injury. These criticisms were as follows:29 
 The fault principle holds those at fault responsible, even if they did not intend 
their actions. 
  
23  New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury Compensation 
for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Government 
Paper, Wellington, December 1967) [Woodhouse Report]. 
24  See Parts 3, 4 and 5 of the Woodhouse Report respectively.  
25  At [185]. 
26  At [240]. 
27  At [243]–[245]. 
28  At [78]. 
29  At [84]–[89]. 
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 The level of damages extracted from a defendant is not made proportional to his 
or her level of wrongdoing, but instead is proportional to the severity of the injury 
inflicted.30 
 The injurer is therefore often as innocent as the injured; but the injured is not 
asked to contribute at all to the cost of the injury. 
 Compulsory industrial and highway insurance makes the fault principle a legal 
fiction; the injurer’s insurer, and by extension the community, carries the loss, not 
the injurer herself. 
 Social progress carries with it increased exposure to some risks. The community 
benefits from progress, and therefore is responsible when those risks eventuate. 
The fault principle places the blame on an individual, but it is the system that is at 
fault, and therefore the community who should bear the loss. 
The common-law rule of contributory negligence – that the plaintiff must bear the loss to 
the extent that he or she caused it – was subject to these same criticisms. The possibility 
of damages being reduced because of contributory negligence was a risk the plaintiff had 
to take in the common-law system, making the outcomes of civil suits even less 
predictable.31    
As a solution to these problems, the Commission recommended creating a system for 
providing “immediate compensation without proof of fault for every injured person, 
regardless of his or her fault, and whether the accident occurred in the factory, on the 
highway, or in the home”.32 This system would replace the common-law right to sue for 
personal injury, as well as the Workers Compensation Act.  
The Commission outlined five principles against which an accident compensation scheme 
should be judged, and which it intended to implement through an accident compensation 
scheme.33 The first principle was community responsibility. A scheme should ensure the 
community is responsible for the victims of accidents. As the risk of injury is created by 
modern society, modern society must provide rehabilitation and compensation for those 
“statistically necessary victims” for whom the risk eventuates.34 This principle illustrates 
the relationship between fault theory and accident compensation in the Woodhouse 
  
30  For more on this point, see J Waldron, “Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss” in DG Owen 
(ed) Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995). 
31  Woodhouse Report, above n 23, at [93]. 
32  At [18]. 
33  At [55]. 
34  At [55]. 
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Report. While an individual may be directly at fault for a particular injury, the 
community is the party that should be responsible – although the community is not at 
fault in the sense that a defendant might be held at fault in a civil suit. The Commission 
saw an accident as a social issue, not as an event between two or more parties, with legal 
implications.35 
The second principle was comprehensive entitlement. The cover provided by the scheme 
should allow all injured people to be compensated equally regardless of how their injuries 
are caused.36 The principle of comprehensive entitlement required the scheme to cover all 
injured persons “on the same uniform method of assessment, regardless of the causes 
which gave rise to their injuries.”37  
The third principle was of complete rehabilitation: the scheme should encourage workers 
to return to work where possible.38 It should provide for real compensation, meaning 
compensation based on real economic and physical losses, not on need.39 The scheme 
must also be administratively efficient.40 
These principles were mostly incorporated into the resulting accident compensation 
legislation.41 The main way in which that Act departed from the principles was that it did 
not provide cover for injuries arising from illness, which arguably violates the principle 
of comprehensive entitlement. This departure was recognised by the Commission in the 
Report.42  
B The scheme today: cover for personal injury caused by accident 
The Accident Compensation Act 2001 (ACA) provides cover for:43 
(a) personal injury caused by an accident to the person: 
(b) personal injury that is treatment injury suffered by the person: 
(c) treatment injury in circumstances described in section 32(7): 
(d) personal injury that is a consequence of treatment given to the person for another 
personal injury for which the person has cover: 
  
35  For more on accidents as social issues, see R Gaskins “Recalling the Future of ACC” (2000) 31 
VUWLR 215. 
36  Woodhouse Report, above n 23, at [55]. 
37  At [55]. 
38  At [58]. 
39  At [59]. 
40  At [62]. 
41  The Accident Compensation Act 1972. 
42  Woodhouse Report, above n 23, at [290]. 
43  Section 20. 
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(e) personal injury caused by a work-related gradual process, disease, or infection 
suffered by the person: 
(f) personal injury caused by a gradual process, disease, or infection that is treatment 
injury suffered by the person: 
(g) personal injury caused by a gradual process, disease, or infection consequential 
on personal injury suffered by the person for which the person has cover: 
(h) personal injury caused by a gradual process, disease, or infection consequential 
on treatment given to the person for personal injury for which the person has cover: 
(i) personal injury that is a cardiovascular or cerebrovascular episode that is 
treatment injury suffered by the person: 
(j) personal injury that is a cardiovascular or cerebrovascular episode that is personal 
injury suffered by the person to which section 28(3) applies. 
The intricacies of each type of cover are too complex to set out in full. However, to give a 
contrast to the treatment injury provisions that will be explained shortly, the following 
paragraphs briefly describe the provisions a claimant must satisfy to claim cover for 
personal injury caused by accident, the most commonly claimed category of cover. 
A claimant seeking cover for her personal injury caused by accident under s 20 of the 
ACA would need to satisfy the definition of ‘personal injury’. Personal injury is defined 
as:44 
(a) the death of a person; or 
(b) physical injuries suffered by a person, including, for example, a strain or a sprain; 
or 
(c) mental injury suffered by a person because of physical injuries suffered by the 
person; or 
(d) mental injury suffered by a person in the circumstances described in section 21; 
or 
(da) work-related mental injury that is suffered by a person in the circumstances 
described in section 21B; or 
(e) damage (other than wear and tear) to dentures or prostheses that replace a part of 
the human body. 
The claimant must then show that the cause of the injury was an ‘accident’. There are 
some exceptions for work-related injuries,45 injuries consequential on personal injuries 
for which the claimant has cover,46 and cardiovascular and cerebrovascular episodes.47 
The definition of ‘accident’ is: 48 
  
44  Section 26. 
45  Section 20(2)(e). 
46  Sections 20(2)(d), (g) and (h). 
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(a) a specific event or a series of events, other than a gradual process, that— 
(i) involves the application of a force (including gravity), or resistance, external to 
the human body; or 
(ii) involves the sudden movement of the body to avoid a force (including gravity), 
or resistance, external to the body; or 
(iii) involves a twisting movement of the body: 
(b) the inhalation of any solid, liquid, gas, or foreign object on a specific occasion, 
which kind of occurrence does not include the inhalation of a virus, bacterium, 
protozoan, or fungus, unless that inhalation is the result of the criminal act of a 
person other than the injured person: 
(ba) the oral ingestion of any solid, liquid, gas, fungus, or foreign object on a specific 
occasion, which kind of occurrence does not include the ingestion of a virus, 
bacterium, or protozoan, unless that ingestion is the result of the criminal act of a 
person other than the injured person: 
(c) a burn, or exposure to radiation or rays of any kind, on a specific occasion, which 
kind of occurrence does not include a burn or exposure caused by exposure to the 
elements: 
(d) the absorption of any chemical through the skin within a defined period of time 
not exceeding 1 month: 
(e) any exposure to the elements, or to extremes of temperature or environment, 
within a defined period of time not exceeding 1 month, that,— 
(i) for a continuous period exceeding 1 month, results in any restriction or lack of 
ability that prevents the person from performing an activity in the manner or within 
the range considered normal for the person; or 
(ii) causes death. 
The definition of ‘accident’ is not fault-based, and an accident does not even need to 
involve a person other than the claimant (with the exception of subss (b) and (ba), 
discussed at p 6). It is also important to note that the definition of ‘accident’ does not 
include an occurrence which is treatment given by a registered health professional.49 
There is therefore no overlap between personal injury caused by accident, and treatment 
injury. 
 
 Cover for Injuries Suffered during Medical Treatment 
The above section described the cover available to a claimant seeking cover for personal 
injury by accident. It is now necessary to look more closely at the cover available to the 
                                                                                                                                            
47  Sections 20(2)(i) and (j). 
48  Section 25. 
49  Section 25(2)(a). 
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victims of injuries caused by treatment. This section will begin by describing the previous 
law, which required claimants to prove fault in some cases, and then discuss the process 
of reforming those sections, and the outcome of the reform: cover for treatment injury. 
A Pre-2005: Medical misadventure 
The Accident Compensation Act 1972 and its 1973 amendments50 incorporated the 
Woodhouse principles into legislation by granting all persons cover for personal injury by 
accident in New Zealand, whether under the earners scheme, the motor vehicle accident 
scheme, or the supplementary scheme.51 ‘Personal injury by accident’ was defined as 
including “the physical and mental consequences of any such injury or of the accident”; 
“medical, surgical, dental, or first aid misadventure” was added shortly after the Act was 
passed, as an illustration to aid interpretation.52 These phrases were not defined. Thus the 
statutory cover was defined inexhaustively and left a lot to judicial discretion. 
The judiciary created two categories of medical misadventure that would provide cover. 
Cover would be granted for an adverse consequence of treatment that was either totally 
unforeseen (medical mishap), or outside the normal range of medical failure for that 
treatment (medical error or medical negligence).53 This approach was adopted by the 
Court of Appeal in Childs v Hillock, which found that cover would be granted where 
injury resulted from an “accident-like” event which removed the injury from the category 
of illness.54  
In 1992, the legislature codified the definition of ‘medical misadventure’.55 Medical error 
was defined as: 56 
the failure of a registered health professional to observe a standard of care and skill 
reasonably to be expected in the circumstances. It is not medical error solely because 
desired results are not achieved or because subsequent events show that different 
decisions might have produced better results. 
In other words, it required negligence on the part of the health professional – codification 
of the common law’s return to the fault standard. ACC had a duty to report all accepted 
  
50  Accident Compensation Amendment Act (No 2) 1973. 
51  Sections 55, 92 and 102B respectively. 
52  Todd, above n 12, at 53. 
53  Accident Compensation Corporation v Auckland Hospital Board [1980] 2 NZLR 748 (HC); 
Viggars v Accident Compensation Corporation [1986] 6 NZAR 235 (HC); Bridgeman v Accident 
Compensation Corporation [1993] NZAR 199 (HC).  
54  Childs v Hillock [1994] 2 NZLR 65 at 72 (CA). See also Todd, above n 12, at 53–54. 
55  Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992, s 5(1). 
56  Section 5(1). 
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instances of medical error to the relevant professional body and to the Health and 
Disability Commissioner.57  The Rt Hon Helen Clark, deputy opposition leader at the 
time, said that the changes “violate all the original premises [of the scheme]. They bring 
back notions of fault, they introduce concepts of negligence.”58  
Medical mishap was defined as an adverse consequence of treatment, which is severe and 
rare.59 A severe consequence was defined as one that resulted in death, hospitalisation for 
more than 14 days, or the claimant suffering a signification restriction or lack of ability 
that prevents her from performing an activity in the manner or within the range 
considered normal for her, and which lasts for more than 28 days in total.60 A 
consequence was rare if it would not occur in more than 1 per cent of cases.61 If the 
consequence was usually rare but the person’s circumstances made it a greater risk, there 
was no medical mishap if the greater risk was known to the person.62 This definition was 
far narrower than the definition at common law, which had simply required the injury to 
be outside the normal range of failure of treatment.63 ACC had discretion to refer the 
appropriate authority to cases of medical mishap if it was necessary or desirable to do so 
in the public interest.64   
B The push for reform 
In 2002, the Hon Ruth Dyson, Minister for ACC, started a review of medical 
misadventure, in conjunction with the Department of Labour, the Ministry of Health, the 
Treasury, the Office of the Health and Disability Commissioner, and the Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet.65 Following analysis of claims, reports and healthcare 
literature, as well as consultation with concerned parties, ACC published a consultation 
document in May 2003, which critiqued the medical misadventure provisions, suggested 
three options for reform, and asked for submissions from the public.66  
With regard to fault, the consultation document found that: 
  
57  Section 284(2). 
58  (19 March 1992) 522 NZPD 7067. See also (19 March 1992) 522 NZPD 7104. 
59  Section 34(1). 
60  Section 34(2). 
61  Section 34(3). 
62  Section 34(5). 
63  Auckland Hospital Board, above n 53; Viggars, above n 53; Bridgeman, above n 53.  
64  Section 284(1).  
65  Accident Compensation Corporation and the Department of Labour Review of ACC Medical 
Misadventure: Consultation Document (May 2003) at 4 [Consultation Document]. 
66  At 4–5. 
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 The biggest problem with medical error cover was that it required the claimant to 
show fault. No other category of cover required a showing of fault.67 
 The requirement to report all instances of medical error led to a blaming culture 
within the health profession, which undermines professionals’ ability to learn 
from mistakes, and slowed improvements to patient safety.68 
 When ACC’s enquiry focused on the fault of health professionals, those 
professionals were less likely to co-operate with the enquiry, which slowed the 
claims procedure.69 
 The focus on fault took time and energy away from focusing on the claimant’s 
injury and more long-term prevention.70 
 The requirement to find fault made claimants, health professionals and the public 
think of ACC as a body that held health professionals to account, or as a 
disciplinary body.71 
The consultation document then outlined three proposals for reform: 
1. Retain the medical error and medical mishap categories, but no longer attribute 
fault to a particular health professional in cases of medical error, and introduce an 
endurability rule in cases of medical mishap, whereby claimants would get cover 
for injuries that were not reasonable for them to endure.72 
2. Provide cover for preventable unintended injuries caused by treatment.73 
3. Provide cover for unintended injuries caused by treatment.74 
The public responses to these options were summarised in Summary of ACC Medical 
Misadventure Consultation, published in August 2003.75  
The first option made medical mishap more individualised: a claimant would be covered 
for medical mishap which was beyond what the claimant should be expected to endure, 
given her underlying condition. Medical error would focus on systemic fault, rather than 
requiring a finding of fault against an individual.76 This change would hopefully 
  
67  Consultation Document, above n 65, at 11. 
68  At 11. 
69  At 11. 
70  At 11. 
71  At 12. 
72  At 16–17. 
73  At 18–19. 
74  At 20–21. 
75  Accident Compensation Corporation and the Department of Labour Summary of ACC Medical 
Misadventure Consultation (August 2003) [Summary of Consultation]. 
76  Consultation Document, above n 65, at 16. 
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encourage health professionals to co-operate more with ACC, but did not remove the 
requirement of fault altogether. The first option was rejected by the majority of 
submitters to the consultation paper.77 People thought that the first option, like the status 
quo, was unfair to claimants and health professionals, was unlikely to speed up the claims 
process, and did not clarify the role of ACC.78 
The second option allowed cover for injuries that could have been avoided, had 
something been done differently, given what was known at the time of treatment.79 This 
approach did not apply a negligence standard, as it would include injuries resulting from 
errors of judgment that a reasonable health professional could have made, as long as that 
error was preventable. However, some element of fault would be necessary. Whether the 
injury was preventable would be assessed in the context of what was known at the time; 
thus only injuries that should have been prevented, but were not, would be covered, and 
some objectively preventable injuries would not attract cover.  
This option was preferred by 29 per cent of people who submitted on the consultation 
document.80 Those who preferred the third option over the second thought that: 
 Preventability implied fault, and therefore has the same problems as the first 
option and the status quo. It does not fit with the accident compensation scheme’s 
no-fault principle. 
 Preventability is difficult to define, and health professionals might find it easy to 
argue that an injury was preventable when it was not. 
 While preventability is the test used in Scandinavia, New Zealand’s cultural and 
legal system is different. Thus the test’s success in Scandinavia is no guarantee of 
its success here. 
The third option was the one that Parliament eventually adopted. This option would 
provide cover for the most claimants, out of the three options and the status quo of 
medical misadventure.81 It provided cover for all injuries that were unintended, meaning 
injuries that were not within the range of expected or likely consequences of treatment. 
The nature of the illness, the circumstances of treatment, and the underlying health of the 
claimant are thus all relevant to determining what an expected or likely consequence of 
treatment is. Consequences that would not attract cover would include deliberate surgical 
incisions, expected side-effects, and failure of the treatment to work when it is likely that 
  
77  Summary of Consultation, above n 75, at 8. 
78  Summary of Consultation, above n 75, at 8. 
79  Consultation Document, above n 65, at 18. 
80  Summary of Consultation, above n 75, at 6. 
81  Kate Smith “Reforming the Medical Misadventure System” [2004] ELB 8 at 10. 
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it will not work. The worse off a claimant’s underlying condition, and the more risky the 
treatment, the less likely it will be that the claimant can get cover for any adverse 
consequences of the treatment. 
Sixty per cent of submitters preferred the third option.82 This option was supported 
because it provided cover in a similar way to the rest of the accident compensation 
scheme; it was no-fault, in keeping with the principles of the legislation; and it 
encourages a learning culture among health professionals. The reasons for preferring a 
no-fault option were that it would: 83 
 improve co-operation between ACC and health professionals, thus speeding up 
the claims process; 
 improve the relationship between health professionals and patients, and within the 
health profession; 
 support a shift from a blaming to a learning culture; 
 stop health professionals from being judged by both ACC and other agencies for 
the same error; 
 encourage people to become health professionals, and retain those who are 
already in the profession; 
 avoid the difficulties caused by finding fault in a complex healthcare system;  
 clear up confusion about ACC’s role, which would stop claimants expecting ACC 
to give them damages or to punish health professionals. 
In response to the Review, the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Bill 
(No 3) was tabled in Parliament on 2 August 2004.84 In the government media release in 
support of the Bill, the Hon Ruth Dyson, Minister for ACC, said that the Bill “removes 
the requirement to find fault”.85 The Explanatory Note to the Bill stated that “The [new] 
provisions do not require ACC to make any findings of fault and, in this sense, it is 
consistent with the no-fault nature of the scheme generally”.86 An overview of the 
treatment injury provisions as they currently stand is set out below. 
C Treatment injury cover 
Cover is granted for:87 
  
82  Summary of Consultation, above n 75, at 6. 
83  At 13. 
84  Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Bill (No 3) (165-3).  
85  Ruth Dyson “Making ACC fairer and simpler” (media release, 2 August 2004).   
86  Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Bill (No 3) (165-3) (explanatory note) at 3.   
87  Section 20.   
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 personal injury that is treatment injury suffered by the person; 
 personal injury that is a secondary infection passed on by a victim to a third party 
or through the victim’s spouse or partner; 
 personal injury caused by treatment of a personal injury for which a person has 
cover; 
 personal injury caused by a gradual process, disease or infection that is treatment 
injury suffered by the person; 
 personal injury caused by a gradual process, disease or infection consequential on 
treatment given to the person for personal injury for which the person has cover; 
and  
 personal injury that is a cardiovascular or cerebrovascular episode that is 
treatment injury suffered by the person. 
A claimant seeking cover for treatment injury must therefore first satisfy the definition of 
personal injury quoted above.88 As with personal injury, the injury cannot just be a 
mental injury;89 nor is chronic pain enough.90 Then the claimant must show that the injury 
is a ‘treatment injury’ under s 32 of the ACA. The claimant must have been: 91 
 seeking treatment from 1 or more registered health professionals; or 
 receiving treatment from, or at the direction of, 1 or more registered health 
professionals. 
Cover for those who have an infection which is a treatment injury also extends to any 
third parties to whom they pass on that infection directly, or to whom their spouse or 
partner passes on that infection directly.92 
The claimant must show that her injury is caused by treatment.93 ‘Treatment’ is defined 
as: 94 
(a) the giving of treatment: 
(b) a diagnosis of a person's medical condition: 
(c) a decision on the treatment to be provided (including a decision not to provide 
treatment): 
(d) a failure to provide treatment, or to provide treatment in a timely manner: 
  
88  Section 32(1). See p 12 of this paper. 
89  Lennon v Accident Compensation Corporation [2013] NZACC 220; Meneses v Accident 
Compensation Corporation [2012] NZACC 328. 
90  Thorburn v Accident Compensation Corporation [2012] NZACC 187. 
91  Section 32(1). 
92  Section 32(7). 
93  Section 32(1)(b). 
94  Section 33(1). 
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(e) obtaining, or failing to obtain, a person's consent to undergo treatment, including 
any information provided to the person (or other person legally entitled to consent on 
their behalf if the person does not have legal capacity) to enable the person to make 
an informed decision on whether to accept treatment: 
(f) the provision of prophylaxis: 
(g) the failure of any equipment, device, or tool used as part of the treatment process, 
including the failure of any implant or prosthesis (except where the failure of the 
implant or prosthesis is caused by an intervening act or by fair wear and tear), 
whether at the time of giving treatment or subsequently: 
(h) the application of any support systems, including policies, processes, practices, 
and administrative systems, that— 
(i) are used by the organisation or person providing the treatment; and 
(ii) directly support the treatment. 
Treatment injury does not include: 
 injury that is a necessary part, or ordinary consequence, of the treatment, taking 
into account all the circumstances of the treatment, including the person's 
underlying health condition at the time of the treatment; and the clinical 
knowledge at the time of the treatment;95 
 personal injury that is wholly or substantially caused by a person's underlying 
health condition;96 
 personal injury that is solely attributable to a resource allocation decision;97 
 personal injury that is a result of a person unreasonably withholding or delaying 
their consent to undergo treatment;98 and  
 personal injury arising out of a claimant’s participation in an unapproved clinical 
trial, when the claimant agreed to participate in the trial in writing.99 
Furthermore, the fact that the treatment did not achieve a desired result does not, of itself, 
constitute treatment injury.100 
The positive definition of ‘treatment injury’ and its relationship with the cover provisions 
in s 20 are not contentious. However, the exceptions to the definition of ‘treatment injury’ 
create more difficulties, because they are difficult to interpret, and because they 
  
95  Section 32(1)(c). 
96  Section 32(2)(a). 
97  Section 32(2)(b). 
98  Section 32(2)(c). 
99  Section 32(4). 
100  Section 32(3). 
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potentially reintroduce a fault element into this category of accident compensation.101 
These exceptions are the main focus of this paper’s analysis of treatment injury, and are 
discussed in turn below. 
 
 Section 32(1)(c): Not a Necessary Part, or Ordinary Consequence, of the 
Treatment 
A The section and its origins 
This section outlines an exception to the definition of treatment injury. Treatment injury 
is: 
(c) not a necessary part, or ordinary consequence, of the treatment, taking into 
account all the circumstances of the treatment, including— 
(i) the person’s underlying health condition at the time of the treatment; and 
(ii) the clinical knowledge at the time of the treatment. 
This exception is a reversal of the previous ‘medical mishap’ category: instead of cover 
only for rare injuries, there is cover for all injuries that are not necessary or ordinary. 
The parameters of what is necessary or ordinary is unclear; the Explanatory Note to the 
Bill lists “a surgical incision during an operation” as an example of a necessary part of 
treatment.102 Holden v Accident Compensation Corporation describes a ‘necessary part of 
treatment’ as a deliberate action, while an ‘ordinary consequence’ “encompasses 
unintended consequences or side effects that are expected to occur in numbers of 
cases.”103 
A claimant should not receive cover for the necessary parts of treatment that could be 
considered a personal injury, because the treatment is necessary to treat the claimant’s 
condition, and can be seen as a part of the claimant’s underlying condition. To take a 
surgical incision as an example, it is a physical injury104 caused by an application of force 
external to the human body.105 However, it would not be right to grant cover for it as a 
personal injury caused by accident, or a treatment injury caused by treatment. Allowing 
such cover would expand the scope of the accident compensation scheme to cover almost 
every patient in the New Zealand medical system. This result is avoided by excluding 
  
101  Ken Oliphant “Beyond Misadventure: Compensation for Medical Injuries in New Zealand” (2007) 
15 Med Law Rev 357 at 382–383. 
102  Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Bill (No 3) (165-3) (explanatory note) at 4. 
103  [2012] NZACC 170 at [44]. 
104  Section 26(1)(b). 
105  Section 25(1)(a)(i). 
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injuries caused by treatment from the definition of ‘personal injury by accident’,106 and 
by excluding necessary parts and ordinary consequences of treatment from the definition 
of ‘treatment injury’.107 
B Case law on s 32(1)(c) 
The leading case is McEnteer v Accident Compensation Corporation.108 The appellant 
received surgery to remove an aneurysm. During surgery, unforeseen complications arose 
which meant that the appellant’s arteries were clipped to control bleeding for a total time 
of 40 minutes, rather than the more standard 12 to 15 minutes.109 The appellant suffered 
cognitive impairment following the surgery, attributed to the longer clipping time.110 Both 
parties agreed “There was no fault in the surgical or medical treatment that the appellant 
received. Rather, appropriate levels of skill and care were employed.”111 
The issue before the court was whether what was necessary or ordinary in treatment 
should be assessed prospectively, before the treatment began, or whether what was 
necessary or ordinary could change in the course of treatment. This was relevant because 
the need to clip the appellant’s arteries for 40 minutes became apparent during the 
surgery, and was not apparent before. The court found that a prospective approach was 
artificial, complex, and did not reflect the statutory language.112 For the purposes of s 
32(1)(c), in determining whether an injury is a necessary part or ordinary consequence of 
treatment, ACC should consider what is necessary or ordinary in the context of what 
actually happened, including aspects of the claimant’s condition that became apparent 
during the course of treatment.113 With the legal question answered, the matter was 
referred back to the District Court to consider whether the 40-minute clipping of the 
appellant’s arteries was a necessary part or ordinary consequence of treatment.114 The 
lack of fault on the part of the registered health professional was not considered fatal to 
the appellant’s case.  
However, Groves v Accident Compensation Corporation presents an example of a case 
where fault was relevant to determining whether an injury fell within the exception of 
  
106  Section 25(2)(a). 
107  Section 32(1)(c). 
108  [2010] NZCA 126. 
109  At [3]. 
110  At [5]. 
111  At [5]. 
112  At [16]–[19]. 
113  At [20]–[21]. 
114  At [22]. 
23 “A Truly No-Fault Approach to Treatment Injury” Ruth Upperton 300 160 502 
 
being a necessary part or ordinary consequence of treatment.115 In this case, the appellant 
had used tricyclic antidepressants and antihistamine medication in the long term, giving 
him xerostomia (dry mouth). This resulted in dental caries, tooth decay and loss of 
teeth.116  
ACC submitted that tooth loss was an ordinary consequence of the medication he was 
taking, and therefore his injury was an ordinary consequence of treatment. The 
appellant’s argument was that part of his treatment should have been for xerostomia, and 
failure to treat it caused his injury (loss of teeth).117 The injury was not an ordinary 
consequence of treatment, because the xerostomia should have been treated and injury to 
the claimant avoided. 
The Court focused on the question of whether it was the appellant’s responsibility to 
maintain his dental hygiene and thus avoid injury, or whether the treating professionals 
should have prescribed further treatment to avoid injury to the appellant.118 The judge 
noted that:119 
Although the accident compensation scheme is a no fault scheme, defining the scope 
of treatment also involves examining where responsibility lies for addressing 
consequences in the nature of side effects. 
The judge found in favour of the appellant, surprisingly because of his underlying health 
condition: the appellant’s anxiety and depression made him an “unreliable agent for his 
own dental hygiene”.120  While the treating professionals and the appellant had a mutual 
obligation to avoid the injury, the treating professionals ultimately continued to have an 
obligation to provide treatment, which they failed to do.121 The judge concluded by 
saying that the case “involves an enquiry into fault, but only for the purpose of defining 
the scope of treatment.”122 
However, the scope of treatment was determinative in the case, and therefore the Court’s 
enquiry into fault was what determined whether the claimant got cover. The fault enquiry 
went towards determining the scope of treatment injury: whether the xerostomia was a 
necessary part or ordinary consequence of treatment, an exception to the definition of 
  
115  [2012] NZACC 200. 
116  At [1]. 
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24 “A Truly No-Fault Approach to Treatment Injury” Ruth Upperton 300 160 502 
 
treatment injury found in s 32 of the ACA. Treatment injury is the definition that must be 
satisfied to get cover under the ACA for an injury relating to treatment, and the 
discussion of fault in the case was more central to the appellant’s likelihood of getting 
cover than the Court admitted.  
C Discussion  
Section 32(1)(c) replaced the medical mishap category of medical misadventure, which 
was concerned with the rarity and severity of injuries, not with fault. Most cases decided 
under this provision revolve around the likelihood of the injury occurring, given the 
circumstances and, in particular, the claimant’s underlying health condition at the time of 
the treatment.123 In excluding necessary and expected injuries from the definition of 
treatment injury, the provision reduces the scope of cover for treatment injury to an 
affordable standard and maintains the idea that injuries are only covered if they result 
from an accident-like event, which normal treatment is not. The provision does not make 
fault a requirement for claiming cover under the accident compensation scheme. 
However, Groves presents an unfortunate precedent by bringing fault into the discussion 
of when a consequence of treatment is ordinary and when a consequence can and should 
be avoided by follow-up treatment.  
As has been discussed earlier, there is a difference between negligence and a mere error 
of judgment. A defendant is only held liable in negligence for conduct that departs from 
the standard of reasonable care. A person may make an error of judgment, but still 
discharge her obligation to act with the skill and care reasonably expected of her.124 
When discussing fault and accident compensation, it is the negligence standard being 
discussed. So did the Court in Groves apply the negligence standard, or were they simply 
looking for an error of judgment (which is not a fault standard)?  
The Court’s discussion of fault in the case was focused on industry standards. Professor 
Martin Ferguson, who had treated the appellant in the past, said that proper treatment 
should have involved follow-up, although he noted that there were no guidelines on what 
should be done to avoid xerostomia.125 The Court accepted Professor Ferguson’s advice, 
noting that there was no evidence of accomplished best practice to contradict him.126 The 
Court also stated that if the health professionals had attempted a programme of treatment 
  
123  See Accident Compensation Corporation v Porter [2010] NZACC 104; Monk v Accident 
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for the appellant’s xerostomia, and the appellant had not co-operated, “the treatment 
obligation might have been discharged”.127 In other words, if best practice is followed by 
health professionals, any resulting side effects are ordinary consequences of treatment, 
and ACC will not provide cover for those side effects. The standard applied in Groves is 
very similar to the negligence standard: what was relevant to the Court was whether the 
health professionals discharged their duty to apply the standard of care expected by the 
industry.   
D Recommendation 
A fault enquiry is an inappropriate way of applying s 32(1)(c), and could lead to courts 
finding that an injury caused by a health professional’s error of judgment is an ordinary 
consequence of treatment. To ensure a no-fault approach is taken, s 32(1)(c) should be 
amended to clarify that an injury caused by an error of judgment is not an ordinary 
consequence of treatment.  
 
  Section 32(2)(a): Wholly or Substantially Caused by a Person’s 
Underlying Health Condition 
A The section and its origins 
There is no cover for personal injury that is wholly or substantially caused by a person’s 
underlying health condition.128 This exception seeks to stop claimants receiving cover for 
incapacities caused by illness. The accident compensation scheme does not provide cover 
for incapacities arising out of illnesses, except for work-related gradual processes, 
diseases or infections,129 which were covered by the preceding Workers’ Compensation 
Act 1956 and thus were included from the start of the scheme.130 Originally, Sir Owen 
Woodhouse intended that the scheme would cover the victims of both injury and 
illness.131 However, the Report and subsequent statutes only provided cover for the 
victims of injury.  
The accident compensation scheme did not cover illnesses because it was intended to 
replace the inefficient, arbitrary system that had preceded it – tort law, as well as statutory 
workers’ compensation – neither of which provided cover for illnesses generally.132 The 
  
127  At [43]. 
128  Section 32(2)(a). 
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26 “A Truly No-Fault Approach to Treatment Injury” Ruth Upperton 300 160 502 
 
cost of the levies that would fund an accident compensation scheme replaced the 
compulsory insurance that people already had to pay as road users or employers. There 
were no similar payments already being made to compensate the victims of illness. It was 
difficult to work out how much it would cost to cover illness, but it was likely to be much 
more expensive than cover for injuries.133  
In 1988, the Law Commission published a report recommending that the accident 
compensation scheme be expanded to include compensation for illnesses.134 The Labour 
Government of the time introduced a Bill to implement the recommendation,135 but it 
could not be passed before the change in government in 1990.136  
Some judges have applied the ACA cover provisions so broadly that claimants have 
received cover for injuries that are arguably more in the way of illnesses.137 These 
decisions have rested on the argument that the accident compensation scheme should be 
interpreted broadly, given Woodhouse’s aim of comprehensive entitlement.138 The 
legislature’s refusal to extend cover to the victims of illness undermines to some extent 
the relevance of the Woodhouse principles as valid interpretative tools of the current 
statutory scheme.139 At the very least, the principle of comprehensive entitlement cannot 
overrule a statutory scheme that explicitly denies cover for illnesses that are not work-
related.140  
It is especially difficult to exclude illness from cover in treatment injury claims, where 
many claimants will have a pre-existing condition that cannot be covered because it is an 
illness. Any injury that occurs during or following treatment could well be caused by the 
underlying condition, and not the treatment itself, and therefore the cover provisions for 
treatment injury must find a way to distinguish between the two. The way to exclude 
illness is to require an accident-like event that causes the injury, which is the purpose of s 
32(2)(a). 
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27 “A Truly No-Fault Approach to Treatment Injury” Ruth Upperton 300 160 502 
 
B Application of the provision 
Stephen Todd has pointed out that this exception may retain the element of fault that 
characterised the prior cover for medical error.141 Todd considers the case of a person 
with an underlying health condition, who receives treatment but then whose condition 
worsens. Did the person’s underlying health condition or the treatment cause the 
worsening of the condition? One way to answer this question would be to apply legal 
causation: was there an unbroken chain of causation between the underlying condition 
and the claimed injury?142 However, this approach would narrow the scope of treatment 
injury cover to the point of excluding some injuries that were covered by medical 
misadventure or that were explicitly intended to be covered by the drafters, such as a 
stroke caused by an allergic reaction to an anaesthetic.143 A person’s underlying health 
condition could be a legal cause of an injury without being wholly or substantially 
causative. 
Another approach is to consider the ‘potency’ of the underlying condition compared to 
that of the treatment (a test borrowed from tort concepts of contribution and contributory 
negligence).144 There must be a regularity of the connection between cause and 
consequence,145 or to put it another way:146 
The underlying notion, no doubt a very rough one, in the selection of one cause as 
more “important”, “effective”, or “potent” than another is its greater tendency in 
normal circumstances, and not merely in the particular case, to be followed by 
harmful (or beneficial) consequences.   
This test fits better with the wording of the statute, which only excludes claims where the 
underlying condition is a substantial cause. 147 The statute requires ACC, in difficult 
cases, to balance different possible causes. The fact that a person’s underlying condition 
is simply a cause of injury is not determinative. Therefore, the potency test is more 
appropriate than a test of legal causation. Todd suggested using the potency test, saying 
that:148 
  
141  Todd, above n 12, at 54–55. 
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Seemingly in each case a claimant must establish on the balance of probabilities that 
treatment, or different treatment, would have improved the patient's condition or 
prevented it from getting worse. The Corporation is no longer required to find fault, 
but the requirement that the claimant show that the health professional should have 
treated or should have treated differently is likely to involve the claimant needing to 
show that the health professional was negligent in making his or her decisions about 
treatment. 
The accuracy of Todd’s prediction can be assessed by looking at the case law that has 
arisen under s 32(2)(a). In Estate of Ian Sheppard v Accident Compensation Corporation, 
the appellant claimed that a failure to adequately treat the deceased’s melanoma resulted 
in death.149 At issue was whether the earlier death of Mr Sheppard was caused by the 
failure to treat, or caused wholly or substantially by cancer, an underlying condition.150 
The judge used practice guidelines151 and expert opinions to determine what steps a 
registered health professional would usually take in treating a patient like Mr Sheppard, 
and whether these steps would have had a different effect to the result obtained by the 
health professional in the particular case.152 The judge concluded that the deceased’s 
condition would not have progressed any other way if the health professional had applied 
a different course of treatment.153 The deceased may have suffered a loss of a chance of 
recovery, but loss of a chance is not sufficient proof of causation in accident 
compensation.154 The focus in the case was on whether “the outcome would have been 
different if the accepted standard of care had been provided”.155  
Earlier cases decided on s 32(2)(a) had taken a similar approach. In Derrick v Accident 
Compensation Corporation, the appellant’s leg had been amputated below the knee after 
an alleged failure to diagnose a melanoma.156 The issue was whether the melanoma (the 
underlying health condition) wholly or substantially caused the injury. The judge found 
that “most GPs would have arranged a biopsy for the appellant”,157 and stated, “I do not 
wish to be blaming a dedicated medical practitioner, but it seems to me that Dr X should 
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154  At [51]. See Accident Compensation Corporation v Ambros [2007] NZCA 204. 
155  At [40]–[41]. 
156  [2010] NZACC 181 at [1]. 
157  At [54]. 
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have sought specialist diagnosis and treatment long before he did.”158 The judge 
concluded that the injury was not inevitable, but could have been prevented by correct 
treatment. The appellant won the case. 
These cases confirm Stephen Todd’s prediction that ACC and the appeal authority will 
consider what other treatment options could have been taken in determining the causal 
potency of the particular treatment option taken.159  Part of that analysis involves 
determining what a registered health professional should have done in the circumstances 
of the case, and comparing that to what actually happened. ACC and the ACC appeal 
authority are applying a fault standard in determining whether to grant cover when the 
claimant’s injury may have been caused by an underlying condition. 
C Discussion 
Section 32(2)(a) makes fault of a health professional the de facto test for some treatment 
injury cases, specifically those where the treatment that allegedly caused the injury is “a 
failure to provide treatment, or to provide treatment in a timely manner”.160 When 
treatment has been provided, and an adverse and unexpected outcome occurs, there is no 
need to find fault. If the outcome is not something usually caused by the underlying 
condition the patient suffers from, it should be relatively easy to prove that the injury was 
caused by the treatment, and ACC would not need to resort to any kind of reasoning 
based on fault. Normal causation law would apply.161 
However, when treatment has not been provided, it is necessary for ACC to consider 
whether treatment should have been provided, and whether it would have stopped the 
injury from occurring. When considering whether treatment should have been provided, 
ACC and the appeal courts have looked at whether the “accepted standard of care” was 
provided,162 a standard that sounds very similar to the “standard of care and skill 
reasonably to be expected in the circumstances” that was applied under medical error.163 
It is less clear how the courts would treat a situation where a health professional makes an 
error of judgment without her conduct departing from the standard of care reasonably 
expected of her. As has been discussed above,164 a health professional is not at fault in 
tort law for an error of judgment that is not negligent. Ideally, ACC would provide cover 
  
158  At [65]. 
159  Todd, above n 12, at 54–55. 
160  Section 33(1)(d).  
161  Ambros, above n 154.  
162  Estate of Ian Sheppard, above n 149, at [40]–[41].  
163  Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act, s 5(1).  
164  At p 8.  
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for those injured by non-negligent errors of judgment, as well as those injured by 
negligent errors. In the above cases, the courts have looked to industry standards and 
what a doctor would be likely to do, which does not give guidance on whether a non-
negligent error that resulted in injury would fit the definition of ‘treatment injury’. Would 
a claimant receive cover from ACC if she were misdiagnosed, even though her condition 
was very rare and most doctors would have misdiagnosed her despite following good 
practice? This question is unanswered as of yet.  
D Recommendation 
This exception is a necessary part of the definition of ‘treatment injury’. It preserves the 
distinction between injuries caused by treatment and incapacities caused by a person’s 
underlying medical condition, where that medical condition does not attract cover itself. 
Where the underlying condition does attract cover (for example, it is caused by an 
accident), the claimant can receive cover under s 20(2)(d) or (h).  
However, to ensure that ACC provides cover for injuries caused by non-negligent errors, 
this provision should be clarified in the same way as s 32(1)(c), to clarify that an injury 
caused by a non-negligent error is a treatment injury. 
 
 Section 32(2)(b): Personal Injury That Is Solely Attributable to a 
Resource Allocation Decision 
A claimant will not receive cover for an injury caused solely by a resource allocation 
decision.165 This provision was carried over from the previous medical error provision,166 
and stops cover being granted for a claimant whose condition deteriorates because they 
have been placed on a waiting list.167 Another example of where this provision may work 
to exclude a claimant from cover is where the claimant should have been treated with a 
drug, but the drug is not funded in New Zealand. The resource allocation exception stops 
the accident compensation scheme from influencing policy decisions about who is treated 
and what treatments are available in our public health system. ACC should not be 
responsible for the health funding and treatment priorities of the government of the 
day.168   
  
165  Section 32(2)(b). 
166  Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001, s 32(4)(c). 
167  Oliphant, above n 101, at 381. 
168  (4 May 2005) 625 NZPD 20268. 
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Ken Oliphant has contended that, as the provision includes the word ‘solely’, a claimant 
could get cover for an injury caused by a resource allocation decision,169  
in conjunction with a clinical action that is not a necessary part of treatment, e.g. 
where the patient is given the wrong priority for treatment as a result of an error or 
where the treatment fails to meet the required standard because RHPs170 are being 
made to work outside their practice areas in a staff shortage. 
He concluded, “Some scope therefore remains for fault to influence the application of the 
new statutory criteria.”171 However, it is equally possible for those collateral causes not to 
be anyone’s fault. For example, it may be no one’s fault if a person is put further down 
the waiting list than she should be because of a computer error. Some errors of judgement 
can lead to injury without anyone’s conduct departing from the standard of reasonable 
care to be expected.172 Litigation could arise over whether a resource allocation is solely 
responsible for an injury, for example where a resource allocation decision is 90 per cent 
responsible for an injury.173 
This exception could be criticised for being inconsistent with the accident compensation 
scheme as a whole. Some road accidents could be attributed to resource allocation 
decisions; for example, accidents that would have been prevented had a lane divider been 
built.174 A person injured in a road accident of this kind could still recover under the 
‘personal injury by accident’ category of cover. It is unclear why only treatment injury 
should have a resource allocation exception. However, what is clear is that this exception 
does not make fault a requirement of cover for treatment injury. 
 
 Section 32(3): The Fact that the Treatment Did Not Achieve a Desired 
Result Does Not, of Itself, Constitute Treatment Injury  
The fact that the treatment did not achieve a desired result is not in itself enough to attract 
cover.175 This exception was present in the prior definition of medical error.176 The effect 
of this section is to require something beyond mere failure of treatment to meet the 
  
169  Oliphant, above n 101, at 381. 
170  Registered health professionals. 
171  At 381. 
172  Todd, above n 12, at 371. 
173  (5 August 2004) 619 NZPD 14705. 
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32 “A Truly No-Fault Approach to Treatment Injury” Ruth Upperton 300 160 502 
 
definition of treatment injury. In many situations, this section would stop claimants from 
getting cover through the treatment injury provisions for illnesses that they would 
otherwise not have cover for. For example, a person who contracts pneumonia would not 
usually get cover for that illness. That person should not start getting cover after being 
prescribed antibiotics that do not cure the infection. There must be some new injury 
arising from the treatment, which can be termed ‘treatment injury’ and granted cover. 
But what counts as a new injury? Todd has this to say on s 32(3): 177   
… the scheme is not intended to underwrite a lack of success in medical treatment. 
But when might there be treatment injury when desired results are not obtained? An 
obvious answer is when the wrong treatment is given. In addition, “treatment” is 
defined as including, inter alia, a decision not to provide treatment; a failure to 
provide treatment, or to provide treatment in a timely manner; failing to obtain a 
person's consent to undergo treatment; and the failure of any equipment, device or 
tool used as part of the treatment process. So once again the concepts of medical 
mishap or medical negligence return in different guises. We may conclude from all 
this at least that both mishap and error implicitly remain highly relevant, and it may 
be that they do in fact cover the ground. 
Much like the exception for injuries caused wholly or substantially by an underlying 
condition, this exception seeks to exclude injuries caused by illness, but in doing so 
imports a fault element into the analysis of whether a claimant has cover for treatment 
injury. This provision is probably unnecessary, given the exception for injuries caused 
wholly or substantially by an underlying condition,178 and the requirement that a 
treatment injury be caused by treatment.179 Section 32(3) should be repealed. 
 
 Relevance of the Claimant’s Fault 
A Introduction  
There are two aspects of the definition of ‘treatment injury’ that make the fault of the 
claimant, not a health professional, relevant to a claim for cover under the ACA. 
First, there is no cover for personal injury that is a result of a person unreasonably 
withholding or delaying their consent to undergo treatment.180  
  
177  Todd, above n 12, at 54–55. 
178  Section 32(2)(a). 
179  Section 32(1)(b). 
180  Section 32(2)(c). 
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Secondly, the ACA defines treatment injury as including personal injury suffered by a 
person as a result of treatment given as part of a clinical trial, if either: 181 
 the claimant did not agree to the trial in writing; or 
 an ethics committee approved the trial, and was satisfied that the trial was not 
to be conducted principally for the benefit of the manufacturer or distributor 
of the medicine or item being trialled. The main criterion for approval is that 
the trial-runners provide adequate compensation in the event of injury. The 
ethics committee must have been approved by the Health Research Council of 
New Zealand or the Director-General of Health at the time the committee 
approved the trial. 
Thus a claimant would not get cover if she agrees to a trial in writing, where the trial is 
unapproved or for the benefit of the manufacturer or distributor of the product. 
B The approach in tort law 
The plaintiff in a tort action may be partly at fault for her loss. The defendant can use the 
plaintiff’s fault as a defence, either to reduce the level of damages, or avoid liability 
altogether. The three main defences that require some fault on the part of the plaintiff are 
discussed below. 
1 Contributory negligence     
A failure by the plaintiff to take reasonable care to protect her interests is a defence to a 
charge of negligence, where the plaintiff’s lack of care contributed to her loss.182 This 
position is codified in New Zealand in the Contributory Negligence Act 1947, which 
states that where a person suffers damage partly due to her own fault, and partly due to 
the fault of another, a claim in respect of that damage is not defeated, but the damages 
recoverable will be reduced, having regard to the plaintiff’s level of fault.  183  
‘Fault’ is defined as “negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which 
gives rise to a liability in tort or would, apart from this Act, give rise to the defence of 
contributory negligence.”184 The plaintiff’s fault must be a proximate cause of the 
damage, much like the defendant’s.185 The standard of care the plaintiff is held to is 
supposed to be equal to the defendant’s. However, greater allowance is made for 
  
181  Sections 32(4)–(6). 
182  Todd, above n 12, at 1095. 
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plaintiffs, because their conduct put only themselves at risk, and they are thus less 
blameworthy than the defendant. Furthermore, defendants can usually rely on insurance 
to pay their damages, while plaintiffs are unlikely to have cover for loss that was their 
own fault.186   
2 Consent 
A defendant has a defence where the plaintiff consented to the action that constitutes the 
tort.187 The defence of consent only applies to intentional torts: battery, assault, false 
imprisonment and trespass.188  It also has limited application in defamation.189 Consent to 
medical treatment is particularly important, as most medical treatments, for example an 
incision during surgery, would otherwise constitute battery.190 Consent in this case means 
informed consent: a patient must be informed of all material risks of the treatment.  191 
3 Assumption of risk 
This defence is also known as volenti non fit injuria, meaning “no harm is done to one 
who consents”.192 Unlike the defence of consent, this defence applies to plaintiffs who 
consent to a risk of harm. To use this defence, a defendant must show that the plaintiff 
was fully aware of what was happening and of the risk of harm, and that the plaintiff 
freely decided to run that risk anyway.193 A key aspect of the defence is that the plaintiff 
chose freely to run the risk, and was under no constraint or interference.194 Thus an 
employee who continues to work despite having full knowledge of a danger at the 
workplace can still recover if that risk eventuates; the employee cannot be said to have a 
free choice to stay at the workplace or leave, because of economic pressure.195                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
C The Woodhouse Report 
In the Woodhouse Report, the possibility of damages being reduced because of the 
defence of contributory negligence was listed as one of the risks of litigation, and thus a 
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reason to introduce an accident compensation scheme.196  The Report also noted that 
criticisms of the fault principle were directed at the Contributory Negligence Act 1947 
when it was passed. 197  This criticism led to a suggestion in the House that all people 
injured in accidents should be fully compensated regardless of fault, a suggestion that 
was taken up by the Woodhouse Report. However, the Report did not recommend 
compensating those whose injuries are deliberately self-inflicted,198 probably intending 
that to cover those who self-harm or commit suicide. 
D Medical misadventure and the fault of the claimant 
The medical misadventure provisions contained the same exclusion for those injured 
during clinical trials as the current treatment injury provisions.199 This exclusion built on 
the common law that preceded it: in Green v Matheson, a woman who was subjected to 
experimental treatment without her consent was found to have cover under the accident 
compensation scheme that was in place at the time.200  
E Fault of the claimant and the accident compensation scheme generally  
There are some accident compensation provisions that expressly consider the fault of the 
claimant:  
 A person cannot get compensation for deliberately self-inflicted injury or suicide, 
but can get cover for treatment of self-inflicted injuries or suicide attempts.201  
 A claimant convicted of the murder of a person who was a financial provider is 
not entitled to any support he or she would otherwise receive for the death of that 
person.202  
 ACC does not have to pay any compensation for economic losses to a claimant 
who is imprisoned,203 and may apply for a court ruling to avoid paying specified 
entitlements where a claimant has suffered injury in the course of committing a 
criminal offence if paying those entitlements would be repugnant to justice.204  
  
196  Woodhouse Report, above n 23, at [93]. 
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Sections 120 and 122 intend to prevent criminals from profiting from their crimes 
through accident compensation. Section 121 helps ACC avoid paying lump-sum amounts 
to prisoners. These sections deal with highly specific situations and are not relevant to the 
case of claimant who has unreasonably withheld or delayed their consent to undergo 
treatment. 
Section 119, which disentitles claimants whose injuries are self-inflicted, seems more 
similar to the unreasonable withholding of consent exception under treatment injury. 
However, the rationale of s 119 is twofold: that suicide and self-harm are health issues, 
not accidents, and that if a person understands the consequences of what they are doing, 
and intends those consequences, they should not be compensated for the harm of those 
consequences. The same reasoning applies to the victims of suicide, although in the case 
of suicide it is of course the families or dependents that are disentitled.205 
F Other relevant law  
Under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, every person has the right to refuse 
medical treatment.206 
Under the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights, patients have “the 
right to the information that a reasonable consumer, in that consumer's circumstances, 
would expect to receive”,207  the right to information a reasonable consumer would 
expect before making an informed choice,208  and the right to honest answers to 
questions.209 Most importantly, medical services can only be provided to a consumer with 
that consumer’s informed consent.210 A health professional who breaches the Code could 
face disciplinary charges or civil proceedings at the Human Rights Review Tribunal.211 
The Tribunal can award damages for any loss not already provided for by the accident 
compensation scheme.212  
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G Unreasonable withholding or delay of consent 
This exception to the definition of treatment injury incorporates elements of the defence 
of contributory negligence into the accident compensation scheme. A patient who 
unreasonably withholds or delays consenting to treatment is failing to reasonably look 
after her own interests; therefore she is at fault for her loss to some degree, and cannot be 
compensated. The exception is very much out of line with the rest of the scheme, where 
fault of the claimant in causing the injury is generally not relevant to cover.  
Self-harm is one category of injury where ACC can consider the fault of the claimant in 
causing the injury.213 However, unreasonable refusal or delay in consenting to treatment 
cannot be considered a health problem in the same way that self-harm might be. 
Furthermore, a person who unreasonably refuses or delays to consent to treatment does 
not necessarily intend the consequences of their refusal or delay (which would likely be a 
worsening of his or her condition). There are many possible reasons a person may refuse 
to or delay in consenting to treatment. For example, a person may have a religious 
conviction that forbids certain forms of treatment, or may be too frightened of the 
treatment to undergo it. It is difficult to know whether these reasons would be considered 
‘unreasonable’ by ACC or a court. There have been no cases on this point. 
It is possible that a person with an injury that does not meet the criteria of ‘personal 
injury’ under the ACA may refuse treatment, and then claim cover for treatment injury 
when their condition worsens. The exception could be seen as a way to avoid 
compensating people for injuries that are strictly caused by their underlying health 
condition; although the ACA already provides that there is no cover for personal injury 
that is wholly or substantially caused by a person’s underlying health condition.214 
A more important question is whether the provision is necessary at all. In what 
circumstances would an injury be held to be caused by treatment, where the claimant 
refused to consent to treatment? If the sole cause of the injury were the claimant’s refusal 
to consent to treatment, there would be no cover even without the specific exception 
provision.215 This is because a treatment injury is a personal injury caused by 
treatment.216 If a claimant refused to consent to treatment, and suffered an injury as a 
result, that claimant would need to establish that they underwent treatment for the 
purposes of ss 32 and 33. Per s 33, a failure to treat is ‘treatment’, but a registered health 
professional cannot be said to have failed to treat a patient if that patient did not consent 
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to treatment. A registered health professional can only give treatment with a patient’s 
consent.217 This is a very important principle enshrined in the Code of Health and 
Disability Services Consumers’ Rights and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
If a claimant delayed giving consent, that claimant might argue that the registered health 
professional failed “to provide treatment in a timely manner”.218 However, the health 
professional could not have acted any earlier than the consent was given; thus the injury 
still had only one cause – the claimant’s delay in consenting – which is not part of the 
definition of treatment under s 33.  
Following this line of argument, even a reasonable refusal or delay in consent to 
treatment which resulted in injury would not attract cover, because there is no 
‘treatment’, under any of the definitions in s 33.  
However, the argument could be made that the legislature intended ‘failure to treat’ to 
include a failure to treat caused by the reasonable refusal of a patient to consent to 
treatment. The legislature’s intention is illustrated by the fact that it thought it was 
necessary to explicitly exclude injuries resulting from an unreasonable refusal to consent 
to treatment. If a failure to treat because of a reasonable refusal to consent were not 
included in the definition of ‘treatment’, it would not be necessary to exclude injuries 
resulting from an unreasonable refusal to consent to treatment. 
The best interpretation, however, is that s 32(2)(c) is unnecessary. It is impossible to fit a 
failure to treat following a claimant’s refusal to consent to treatment into the definition of 
treatment under s 33. Any injury resulting from a claimant’s refusal or delay in 
consenting to treatment, whether reasonable or not, would not get cover under the 
treatment injury provisions. 
H Where a claimant agreed in writing to participate in an unapproved clinical trial 
This exception draws on the same reasoning as the common law defence of assumption 
of risk, or volenti non fit injuria. Where a claimant has agreed in writing to participate in 
a trial, we assume she has understood the risks of the trial and been fully informed, and 
has accepted that risk. Therefore, she cannot claim any cover arising from taking that 
risk.  
However, unlike the assumption of risk defence, the agreement in writing exception does 
not include a test of informed consent or adequate information. A person could agree in 
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writing to participate in a clinical trial without being informed of the risks of the trial; a 
person could even agree in writing to participate in a clinical trial and be incapable of 
understanding the risks of the trial.  
Furthermore, the assumption of risk defence only applies to people who freely agree to 
risk harm, without the pressure of economic or other constraints. A person who agrees to 
participate in an unapproved clinical trial may be very poor, or very sick and hoping to be 
cured. In neither situation is a person free of constraints on whether or not to participate. 
The situation of a poor person agreeing to participate in a clinical trial is analogous to that 
of an employee who continues to work in a dangerous workplace; both have agreed to a 
risk of harm, but out of economic necessity, not free choice.  
This exception is also inconsistent with the accident compensation scheme as a whole, 
which generally does not refuse cover to those who consent to a risk of harm, even if 
their decision is made freely. A person who gets into a car with a drunk driver will be 
covered if injured during an accident caused by the driver’s drunkenness, even if the 
accident was a risk the person knowingly took – even if the accident was very likely, 
given the driver’s condition. A person who uses unapproved equipment to build a shed, 
and is injured when the equipment malfunctions, would still get cover despite knowingly 
taking a risk with unapproved equipment. In the same way, a person who takes part in an 
unapproved clinical trial should get cover for any injuries that result.  
The second exception to cover for injuries arising from a clinical trial is where the trial is 
unapproved. The origin of this exception is less clear than that of consenting in writing to 
the trial. Potentially, the drafters thought that those who participate in approved trials are 
taking on a risk that nevertheless benefits society. Approved trials (that are not funded by 
those who seek to profit from that trialled product) lead to usable results and potentially 
to better medicine. Unapproved trials only add to misinformation.  
The same analogies can be made as before – drunk driving is not useful to society, and 
nor is using unapproved equipment to build a shed. Going back to the Woodhouse 
Report, one of the original aims of the accident compensation scheme was to compensate 
people whose injuries were “statistically inevitable” disadvantages of social progress. The 
modern world is a dangerous place, but to lose the dangers would be to also lose the 
benefits; thus the community as a whole has a responsibility to compensate those for 
whom the dangers eventuate.219  
However, the best interpretation of that aim is that the disadvantages of modern society 
include those in which the claimant’s fault plays a part. To return to the drunken driving 
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example, the intention of the accident compensation scheme is not to cover those who 
drive safely, but still suffer injury (as some, statistically speaking, must, given the number 
of cars on our roads). The intention is to cover everyone who is injured on the road, 
regardless of their fault or standard of driving, because bad driving is part of the 
consequence of allowing driving in the first place. In the same way, the pharmaceutical 
industry and the methods of drug testing mean that some companies may use unapproved 
trials. This is an unfortunate side-effect of the drug industry as a whole. To eradicate it 
completely, we would need to eradicate the drug industry. Thus ACC should provide 
compensation for those who are injured in the course of unapproved clinical trials, 
regardless of their consent to the risk of harm.  
The parliamentary materials surrounding the 2005 amendment do not explain the 
reasoning behind this provision. New Zealand First MP Barbara Stewart said that “notice 
has to be taken of people who willingly undergo trials so that the rest of our people can 
be cured of some disease by some new medicine or treatment that has been developed. 
Quite often people innocently go along to these trials … sometimes the outcome is not 
exactly what they wanted.”220 However, many people who willingly trial medicines may 
not be covered by the provision, if for example the trial is not approved by an ethics 
committee.  
The rationale may be that a person who consents in writing to a non-approved clinical 
trial understands the risks of the trial and consents to being exposed to those risks.221 
However, this rationale is not applied throughout the accident compensation scheme; a 
person who consents to a risk of injury by playing a highly physical sport, or by agreeing 
to be driven by a drunk driver, does not miss out on cover because she has consented to 
that risk and it eventuated. 
I Recommendation 
As discussed above, the exception to cover where the claimant withheld or delayed her 
consent to treatment is unnecessary and should be removed from the section.  
The provisions concerning clinical trials are more complicated. A provision that allows 
ACC to provide cover to those injured during a clinical trial is useful, because it clarifies 
that treatment given during a clinical trial does satisfy the definition of ‘treatment’ in the 
ACA. However, it is unnecessary and inappropriate to exclude from cover those who 
agree in writing to an unapproved clinical trial. For these reasons, it is recommended that 
ss 32(4)–(6) be repealed and replaced with: 
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(4) Treatment injury includes personal injury suffered by a person as a result of 
treatment given as part of a clinical trial. 
 
 
 ACC’s Reporting Function 
A Pre-2005 
Under the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001, ACC had a 
discretion to “bring to the attention of or refer to any appropriate person or authority any 
matters concerning medical error or medical mishap if the Corporation considers it 
necessary or desirable to do so in the public interest (whether for reasons of public health 
or public safety)”.222 It also had a mandatory duty to report all accepted instances of 
medical error to the relevant professional body and to the Health and Disability 
Commissioner.223  A report of this kind would include the name of the claimant, the date 
and circumstances of the medical misadventure occurred, and the name of the registered 
health professional or organisation to whom the medical misadventure is attributed.224 
Non-individualised data on injuries and their causes were generally welcomed, but the 
mandatory duty to report data on individuals was a contentious issue, and a major aspect 
of the 2003 review of the medical misadventure provisions.225 There were concerns that 
mandatory reporting of medical errors encouraged ‘defensive medicine’ in the same way 
that tort law had.226 When adverse events did occur, the threat of reporting discouraged 
health professionals from co-operating with medical misadventure claims and also 
discouraged an open learning environment where problems were discussed. 227 
B Reform 
During the 2003 review of the medical misadventure provisions, the Department of 
Labour and ACC polled affected parties on their views of the reporting mechanism. 
There was a general view that ACC has a public safety role in informing people on 
medical misadventure. Unsurprisingly, the majority of claimants and their families 
thought that mandatory reporting of accepted medical errors would ensure adequate 
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accountability on the part of registered health professionals and organisations.  228 Most 
health professionals, District Health Boards and health associations preferred no reporting 
at all. They thought this approach would ensure open disclosure on injuries by health 
professionals, and enable both timely patient recovery and improvements to healthcare.229 
There was also an option to allow discretionary reporting, which was favoured by some 
health professionals and claimants. This option would allow ACC to act as a safety net, 
picking up on gross negligence and repeat errors, but not routinely reporting every case 
where there was an element of fault. This option was implemented in the 2005 reform. 
C Current law 
Section 284 places a duty on ACC to report information to the relevant authority where 
there is a “risk of harm to the public”. This duty only applies to information ACC gains 
through claims related to treatment injury, or historic medical misadventure claims. The 
statutory wording allows for reporting regardless of fault, as a risk of harm could be 
posed by many things, for example an individual, an organisation, a technique, or a piece 
of equipment.230  
The provision gives ACC broad discretion over whether to report incidents, and thus its 
policy on this matter is determinative. ACC’s policy is to report all ‘sentinel events’ 
under s 284, meaning events during treatment that result in unanticipated death or major 
permanent loss of function. ACC also reports all ‘serious events’, meaning those with a 
potential for causing death or major permanent loss of function, where there is a high or 
moderate likelihood of recurrence.231 The person notified is the Director-General of 
Health. It is then up to the Director-General to decide whether to tell the treating facility, 
and whether a response is required that can improve safety. ACC may notify a 
registration authority “if it has expert clinical advice that there are serious competence 
concerns.”232  
The 2005 reform was intended as a shift away from fault-based cover and a culture of 
blame. The reformed reporting mechanism ultimately favoured public safety over co-
operation with health professionals, by allowing reporting in some cases. However, the 
new provision is a much softer approach than before, and ACC’s implementation of the 
provision is sensible, reporting only where there is a chance of avoiding future death or 
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major permanent loss of function. The reporting mechanism provides an effective way for 
ACC to fulfil its aim of preventing injuries.233  
One of the problems with the original reporting provision, as well as with the medical 
error category generally, was that it created confusion about ACC’s role, suggesting that 
ACC could hold health professionals to account. This frustrated patients looking for 
something more from ACC than it could provide, and potentially confused health 
professionals as well.234 This confusion may remain despite the 2005 reforms. ACC’s 
role in preventing injuries, as well as compensating for injuries, necessarily overlaps with 
the role of the Health and Disability Commissioner, as well as other agencies, who work 
to improve healthcare and bring negligent health professionals to account.  
 
 Is Compensation Inherently Fault-Based?  
Before concluding on the treatment injury provisions, it is worth considering the 
argument raised by Dr Brian Easton that compensation is inherently fault-based. Easton 
has argued that the idea of compensation is a “living fossil in the New Zealand no fault 
system”.235 Compensation is justified in a fault system because it removes the inequity of 
the victim losing out while the person who caused the damage is unaffected, and because 
it acts as a market deterrent, thereby reducing the number of accidents and injuries. The 
accident compensation scheme takes the injurer out of the picture, by providing no-fault 
compensation from public funds. The purposes of compensation – equity and deterrence 
– no longer apply.  
Easton traces the development of compensation-based remedies in tort law to the 
unavailability of rehabilitation-based remedies in the nineteenth century.236 By the time 
the Woodhouse Report was written, effective rehabilitation had become a possibility, and 
the Commission prioritised it over compensation for that reason.237 Easton suggests that 
ACC should gradually phase out compensation and emphasise rehabilitation and 
prevention.238 Rehabilitation provided by ACC should converge with rehabilitation 
provided by other agencies. These changes would provide better remedies for claimants, 
and reduce inequities between those with injuries and those with illnesses. Easton noted 
that rehabilitation can still involve cash payments, but the focus is on improving the 
  
233  Brian Easton “Ending Fault in Accident Compensation: Issues and Lessons from Medical 
Misadventure” (2004) 35 VUWLR 821 at 824. 
234  Oliphant, above n 101, at 370. 
235  Easton, above n 233, at 825. 
236  At 825–826. 
237  At 826. 
238  At 826–827. 
44 “A Truly No-Fault Approach to Treatment Injury” Ruth Upperton 300 160 502 
 
claimant’s wellbeing, not on compensating the claimant for loss. Compensation might 
still have a place in the scheme where rehabilitation is inadequate, for example where the 
injury creates a permanent disability.239  
However, Easton fails to recognise that the accident compensation scheme works on the 
principle of community responsibility. The community as a whole takes on the role of 
injurer for the purposes of compensation under ACC. While ACC does not require that 
the community be at fault for a particular injury, the community is held responsible for 
each injury, because accidents are a social problem. The ACC form of compensation does 
not require fault. It just requires loss. Rather than making the claimant bear the full loss 
of her injury, the loss is spread around the community by compensating the claimant 
through funds collected from the public.  
Thomas Douglas has this to say on compensation, specifically accident compensation that 
he thought should be paid to the victims of illness and genetic conditions:240 
…it is natural, at least in legal contexts, to think that compensation is necessarily a 
response to some harm previously inflicted by the compensator. I will, however, 
understand compensation more broadly so as to include any attempt to restore a 
person to some better situation that she previously enjoyed, or that she is imagined to 
have enjoyed prior to the natural and social lottery of birth. (Those who find this 
definition implausible may simply read ‘compensation-like benefit’ whenever I use 
the word compensation.) 
Douglas went on to argue that expansion of the scheme would require less generous 
entitlements, and eventually, merging the scheme with the pre-existing healthcare system 
and social security.241 However, Douglas reached this conclusion because of the 
prohibitive cost of covering incapacities arising from illness, not because compensation 
cannot be paid out to those incapacitated by disease.242 Compensation can be paid where 
there is loss, not only where there is fault. 
Therefore, while compensation has evolved from fault principles, it is consistent with the 
no-fault basis of accident compensation to continue to provide compensation to eligible 
claimants. 
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 Recommendations 
I recommend some minor amendments to s 32 of the ACA, to remove the elements of 
fault still present in the treatment injury provisions. These amendments are marked on the 
copied provision below. Section 33, which defines ‘treatment’, does not require 
amendment. 
32 Treatment injury 
(1) Treatment injury means personal injury that is— 
(a) suffered by a person— 
(i) seeking treatment from 1 or more registered health professionals; or 
(ii) receiving treatment from, or at the direction of, 1 or more registered 
health professionals; or 
(iii) referred to in subsection (7); and 
(b) caused by treatment; and 
(c) not a necessary part, or ordinary consequence, of the treatment, taking into 
account all the circumstances of the treatment, including— 
(i) the person's underlying health condition at the time of the treatment; 
and 
(ii) the clinical knowledge at the time of the treatment. 
(2) Treatment injury does not include the following kinds of personal injury: 
(a) personal injury that is wholly or substantially caused by a person's underlying 
health condition: 
(b) personal injury that is solely attributable to a resource allocation decision:. 
(c) personal injury that is a result of a person unreasonably withholding or 
delaying their consent to undergo treatment. 
(3) The fact that the treatment did not achieve a desired result does not, of itself, 
constitute treatment injury. 
(3) Despite subsections (1) and (2), an injury caused by an error that occurs during 
treatment is a treatment injury, whether the error is negligent or not. 
(4) Treatment injury includes personal injury suffered by a person as a result of treatment 
given as part of a clinical trial, in the circumstances described in subsection (5) or 
subsection (6). 
(5) One of the circumstances referred to in subsection (4) is where the claimant did not 
agree, in writing, to participate in the trial. 
(6) The other circumstance referred to in subsection (4) is where— 
46 “A Truly No-Fault Approach to Treatment Injury” Ruth Upperton 300 160 502 
 
(a) an ethics committee— 
(i) approved the trial; and 
(ii) was satisfied that the trial was not to be conducted principally for the 
benefit of the manufacturer or distributor of the medicine or item being 
trialled; and 
(b) the ethics committee was approved by the Health Research Council of New 
Zealand or the Director-General of Health at the time it gave its approval. 
(8) If a person (person A) suffers an infection that is a treatment injury, cover for that 
personal injury extends to— 
(a) person A's spouse or partner, if person A has passed the infection on directly 
to the spouse or partner: 
(b) person A's child, if person A has passed the infection on directly to the child: 
(c) any other third party, if person A has passed the infection on directly to that 
third party: 
(d) person A's child or any other third party, if— 
(i) person A has passed the infection directly to his or her spouse or 
partner; and 
(ii) person A's spouse or partner has then passed the infection directly to 
the child or third party. 
 
 Conclusion 
In this paper, I have analysed the ACA provisions that relate to treatment injury, to show 
that fault is still a factor in ACC’s decisions to provide cover for claimants injured during 
medical treatment. By putting these provisions into the context of the accident 
compensation scheme as a whole, and by drawing comparisons with the tort law 
approach and the medical misadventure provisions that preceded treatment injury cover, I 
have shown that it is inappropriate for these fault elements to remain in the legislation. 
They can be removed with relatively minor amendments to s 32 of the ACA. I 
recommend making these changes and bringing the treatment injury provisions into line 
with the no-fault foundation of accident compensation in New Zealand. 
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